Carnegie Corporation and Russia: Grantmaking Amidst Transformation

For nearly 25 years, first the Soviet Union and then its successor states have been convulsed by transformation. During this historic period, Russia cast off its Communist past, embraced alien forms of democracy and civil society, and most recently slowed the pace of political liberalization. Similarly, initial administrative changes snowballed into radical market reforms that sent the Soviet economy into a tailspin. What ensued was the dramatic contraction of Russia’s economy that only over the last five years, and narrowly dependent on spikes in world energy prices, registered the beginnings of recovery. Yet endemic problems of arbitrary rule, deep-seated sociodemographic ills, and persistent non-market business and financial practices continue to expose the fragility of the present calm. If left unabated, these mutually reinforcing negative trends risk emasculating the national capacity to sustain Russia’s modernization over the coming decades.

At the same time, Russia’s strategic landscape has been in constant flux. The end of bipolar rivalry upended established international balances of power and institutions. Relations with the U.S. passed through phases of renewed Cold War, cooperative engagement, mutual frustration and superficial friendship to a current lowgrade thaw. Mikhail Gorbachev’s pursuit of “common human values” quickly morphed into Moscow’s abdication of superpower status and conspicuous turn to the West. Strategic visions then hardened, as the country was shorn of its empire and relegated to the margins of globalization. Change continued as President Vladimir Putin “pragmatically” acclimated to unavoidable concessions and shed unrealistic global pretensions while asserting Russia’s competitive interests in the “near abroad.”

Amidst these momentous shifts, one constant has been Carnegie Corporation of New York’s commitment to fostering mutual understanding and engagement between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. Since 1983, under the stewardship of two presidents, the Corporation provided roughly $120 million to major projects aimed at focusing policy, public, scientific and scholarly attention on the imperatives and opportunities for taming reckless policies and cementing closer bonds. As programmatic priorities evolved from addressing the most pressing challenges of averting nuclear war, to deepening and broadening cooperative security, to forging partnerships and building inroads for Russia’s integration with the West, the Corporation remained steadfast at promoting confidence building and closer interaction between the two leaderships and societies.

With the emergence of a “new Russia” and with leaderships in Washington and Moscow concentrating on new global threats, the time is ripe to reflect on Carnegie Corporation’s programmatic experience with the former Soviet Union. How did the Corporation’s strategy for advancing mutual understanding, linkages and cooperation evolve to keep pace with the volatile landscape? What were key practical, indirect and unintended achievements of its grants? Alternatively, what were some of the “hard lessons”
associated with developing and implementing the Corporation’s Russia-related programs?

*Written by: Adam Stulberg. Dr. Stulberg has written several reports for Carnegie Corporation of New York on subjects concerning Russia’s foreign and security policies, as well as authored the final report of the Russia Initiative. His forthcoming book on Russia’s energy statecraft will be published by SUNY Press.*
Strategic Visions

Prompted by a dangerous gap between the mounting superpower rivalry and the negligible understanding of Soviet behavior among the American public and their leaders, Carnegie Corporation spearheaded support after World War II for inter-disciplinary research on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This led to the founding of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University in 1948 that attracted talented scholars to the field. The research and study supported by these and other grants provided by the foundation world effectively created a reservoir of knowledge for senior policymakers to draw on at the dawning of the Cold War.

Avoiding Nuclear War

After concentrating primarily on domestic causes throughout the mid-1960s and 1970s, Carnegie Corporation once again took the lead to move the Soviet Union to the forefront of foundation grantmaking. In 1983, under the stewardship of new president David A. Hamburg, the Corporation launched a major campaign to marshal independent research and policy analysis aimed at encouraging both superpowers to step back from renewed confrontation and to delineate sober-minded prospects for improving bilateral relations. This Avoiding Nuclear War (ANW) program was premised on investigating creative ways for extricating both countries from an intensifying security dilemma, where mutual fear, mistrust, misperceptions and commitments to containment elevated each side’s anxiety and propensity to resort to even more threatening policies with potentially grave consequences for humanity. The ANW program aspired to generate a “deeply innovative combination of new ideas, understanding and education” about nuclear crisis management, crisis prevention and confidence building. Because assumptions about Soviet foreign and military ambitions seemed to be key factors driving U.S. policy and “due to startling revelations about the profound misunderstanding of American policymaking within senior Soviet leadership and intelligence circles,” Hamburg at the outset envisioned Soviet-related projects as integral to the ANW program. Accordingly, from 1983-1990, the Corporation devoted roughly half of the program’s $50 million portfolio to strengthening and cultivating “the strongest possible” scholarly and policy analytical expertise for examining Soviet decision making and security policy, improving communication among Soviet and American policymaking and policyadvising communities and elevating public awareness and understanding of the fateful bilateral relationship.
Guided by this strategy, the lion’s share of Soviet-related grants during the period fell into four basic categories. The first consisted of multi-year, multi-million-dollar institutional grants to Columbia University, Stanford University, the University of California, RAND and MIT to revitalize first-rate graduate training and scholarly research on Soviet foreign and security policies. This was complemented by support to Duke University and the Social Science Research Council for training on Soviet domestic politics that, together with the institutional grants, aimed at attracting a new generation of scholars to advise the American public and policymakers. Second, the ANW program invested in leading policy-analytic research organizations, such as the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as well as top-flight academic research centers (such as at Harvard and Georgetown universities as well as the Brookings Institution) to generate immediate and long-term assessments of Gorbachev’s “glasnost” and “new thinking” and their implications for crisis management and prevention. As new opportunities arose to engage Soviet scientists and analysts with direct access to the Kremlin, Hamburg and the program staff championed formation of joint study groups, consisting of policy experts and scientists from both sides of the U.S.-Soviet divide. This featured collaborative projects between Harvard University and the Soviet Foreign Ministry that explored alternative negotiating strategies, as well as joint technical studies on verification and compliance of arms control agreements and the health consequences of nuclear war between respective institutes of both countries’ Academy of Sciences.

The ANW program also accented support for linkages and exposure to the Soviet Union for disparate audiences. Successive grants to the Aspen Institute brought together U.S. Congressmen and Soviet specialists. Through a combination of bi-annual retreats and regular breakfast meetings, the project served the dual purposes of engaging legislators with little knowledge of the Soviet Union directly with policy scholars (and on occasion, their Soviet counterparts) in a bipartisan format, while enlightening experts and Soviet officials on the concerns of U.S. congressional leaders. Finally, the Corporation supported various public awareness projects, such as collaboration between the Public Agenda Foundation and Brown University on alternative directions for U.S.-Russia relations, as well as several educational documentaries, including two television series, that traced the evolution of Soviet society under Gorbachev (Gorbachev’s Russia) and ebbs and flows in the bilateral relationship (Global Rivals).
Cooperative Security
As the Soviet Union imploded in the early 1990s, Carnegie Corporation’s commitment to Eurasia did not falter. Rather, support was reoriented under the Cooperative Security (CS) program in 1991 to seize upon unprecedented opportunities for deepening crisis prevention activities and redressing new global dangers posed by the uncontrolled spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), nationalism, and ethnic enmities that were unleashed by the Soviet Union’s disintegration. Hamburg likened the CS program to “preventive public health,” and spurred on by the analytical and operational detail generated by a steering committee composed of John Steinbruner, Ashton Carter and William Perry, carved out an agenda for encouraging collective action to arrest these new international security challenges. A priority was once again accorded to Eurasia based on convictions that Russia remained a crucial but vulnerable partner in promoting a stable and lasting peace, and that the primary threats to new security regimes derived directly from the stress on political, social and defense industrial infrastructures enfeebled by the post-Soviet transition. Accordingly, the Corporation augmented the previous strategy for improving mutual understanding with emphasis on stemming “loose nukes” and other military dangers precipitated by the Soviet collapse, strengthening democratic and market institutions and fostering creative approaches to conflict resolution within the region.

The Corporation gave new priority to projects that facilitated understanding of post-Soviet domestic politics and interaction among the newly independent states (NIS). Institutional grants to Columbia University and the University of California broadened support for training and research to dissect the links between Soviet domestic politics and foreign policy behavior. The CS program also sponsored efforts to build indigenous capacity for resolving ethnic and nationalist conflicts. This featured development of a community of U.S. and Russian scholars and experts organized by the Conflict Management Group and the International Research and Exchanges Board, who were committed to devising early warning systems, conducting training programs, and advising officials in the region engaged in managing ethnic relations.

Another funding priority was placed on Western technical assistance projects. Prominent grants to Harvard University produced a blueprint for U.S. government action in support of the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, safe storage of fissile material and environmental remediation.
of the downsized Soviet nuclear complex. This was buttressed by grants to the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Princeton University and Stanford University for work with Russian partners, respectively, on training a new cadre of nonproliferation specialists and developing a nuclear safeguards culture, reprofiling nuclear weapons scientists and converting Russian defense companies. At the same time, the CS program funded initiatives by prominent scholars and experts at Harvard University to open direct dialogues and workshops on military reform and democratic reorganization with senior U.S. and Russian officers. Another set of grants channeled through Harvard generated practical Western advice for crafting the complex macro-level political, legal and financial institutions necessary to jump-start progress towards democratic and market reforms in Russia and the NIS. These projects enlisted diverse and highly influential partners that included legislators at different political levels, emerging business leaders, and journalists from across the former Soviet Union. In an effort to arrest the plight of former Soviet scientists, the CS program also sponsored exchanges both with each other and international counterparts via computer networks and teleconferencing. This included discretionary support for various U.S.-Russian scientific conferences that drew public, commercial and scholarly attention to the state of Russian basic science, science policy and the domestic and foreign dimensions of the country’s “brain drain.”
Preventing Deadly Conflict

Between 1994-1997, Carnegie Corporation’s grantmaking strategy in Eurasia shifted in concert with the acceleration of transformation. The Corporation moved to broaden the “prevention agenda” to meet an array of challenges of mass inter-group violence spawned by collapsing state structures, social unraveling, economic instability and the loss of national identity left in the wake of the Soviet disintegration. While continuing to place priorities on promoting nonproliferation and U.S.-Russian cooperation, the new Preventing Deadly Conflict (PDC) program modified emphasis from strengthening generic democratizing efforts to more focused study of intra- and inter-state crisis prevention and resolution, and the spillover effects for consolidating democratic reforms and arresting military dangers concomitant to the Soviet collapse. As recollected by PDC program chair David Speedie, the prevention theme “was embraced with a vengeance,” with the Corporation committed to a proactive posture for developing novel methods of non-violent problem solving for the region. Drawing on substantial intellectual capital generated by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict for analytical guidance, PDC grants in this area were targeted at identifying the sources of inter-group violence, as well as the role, modalities and range of international assistance for dealing with diverse ethnic, civil and national “hot spots” across Eurasia.

Consistent with the broadened strategic horizon, the Corporation funded practical activities designed to build international and inter-regional elite networks and dialogues. The Center for Post-Soviet Studies used Corporation support to mobilize Central Asian and Russian policymakers and security experts to discuss mutual interests and approaches to regional conflict prevention, as well as to undertake comparative analysis of ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Renewed grants to the Conflict Management Group created electronic links between regional ethnographers, international institutions and foreign counterparts, as well as funded the “Hague Initiative,” which provided a forum for political and ethnic leaders from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to discuss alternative approaches to federalism and intrastate conflict management. Similarly, repeat grants to Stanford University promoted scholarly inquiry of ethnic conflicts in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, fostered an off-the-record meeting of the three presidents of the South Caucasus, as well as established multilateral working groups comprised of experts and representatives of affected governments and ethnic communities to address actual and potential flashpoints in the former Soviet south.
The Corporation continued to support policy-relevant activities related to nonproliferation and strengthening strategic ties between the U.S. and Russia. This included grants to the University of Georgia for assisting the Soviet successor states to draft and implement arms export control laws compatible with international norms and agreements. At Stanford University, a multidisciplinary team of scholars was funded to analyze the motives behind the mutual benign neglect that characterized U.S.-Russian relations and to assess critically the contours of respective nuclear postures in a post-deterrence era. The Corporation also broadened the range of high-level Track II diplomacy to augment the ongoing Congress-Duma exchanges orchestrated by the Aspen Institute. This included sponsoring dialogues and working groups on selected security and foreign policy issues involving bipartisan groupings of leading American and Russian policymakers, insiders, military officers and “strategic thinkers” that were organized by the Aspen Institute in collaboration with Russian partners, including the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.

Additionally, the Corporation directed new support for projects designed to strengthen democratic institutions through professional training programs for executive decision makers, legislators, military professionals and policy analysts from the region. One form involved bringing these individuals to the U.S. for workshops, as reflected in grants to RAND for the training of policy experts and multiple grants to Harvard University for training seminars on democratic processes for Duma members and staffers and high-ranking Russian military officers. This was complemented by working with other foundations to support formation of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Moscow branch, the Carnegie Moscow Center, as the main locus for indigenous capacity building with an explicit training element. In addition to generating wide-ranging research on contemporary Russian political and social issues, the Center emerged as the first neutral forum for Russian domestic and foreign policy discussion and collaboration between leading academic and policymakers of the two countries.
International Peace and Security
The Corporation’s grantmaking strategy shifted again in 1997-1998 when it became evident that after seven years of pursuing market and democratic reforms, Russia was on the verge of economic collapse, political stalemate, military breakdown and national identity crisis. The tightening of the Gordian Knot of great power contraction, dysfunctional public and private institutions and socioeconomic decline seemed to be taking its toll on every aspect of the country’s national security and on the confidence needed to deepen international cooperation. The U.S.-Russian relationship was enveloped by acrimony on critical issues ranging from WMD proliferation, to the management of regional challenges in the Middle East, Central Asia, and North Korea, to the importance of international organizations and U.S. global leadership. The attendant uncertainty about Russia’s developmental trajectory and strategic orientation motivated incoming Corporation president, Vartan Gregorian, to retain prevention as the central rationale for grantmaking but to explore creative directions for extending it to meet new pressing global security and non-security challenges, as well.

Under the aegis of the International Peace and Security (IPS) program formed in 1999, the Corporation infused established priorities on nonproliferation and U.S.-Russian relations with special attention to two new elements. The first centered on promoting Russia’s deep and irreversible political, economic and security integration with the Euro-Atlantic community. According to Deana Arsenian, current chair of the program, the key to restoring Russia’s national capacity “moved away from discrete technical assistance programs toward cultivating new approaches to unraveling the country’s profound and interlocking ailments.” As a result, the Corporation began to explore ways to best help Russian political, business, civic and military leaders “to help themselves” gain confidence and resources needed to attain full integration with the West. Integral to this effort has been support for transitioning the region’s institutions of higher learning into modern, competitive and self-sustaining entities capable of addressing global educational challenges. Second, there was renewed focus on common U.S.-Russian strategic interests and developing assets for contending with contemporary global threats. Here, the IPS program has featured methods for engaging and reassuring Russia that treat it as “part of the solution” to managing these challenges, rather than as “part of the problem.”

Two clusters of projects were emblematic of the IPS program strategy. The first centered on the development, execution and follow-up to the
Corporation’s “Russia Initiative.” Determined to bring international attention to the threats posed by a weak Russia, to clarify Russia’s political and economic predicament, and to redress compartmentalized thinking on Russia, Gregorian and the IPS staff, with intellectual contributions by the Corporation’s three Academic Fellows (Rajan Menon, John Steinbruner and Thomas G. Weiss), committed $1 million to form four interdisciplinary study groups. Each group was comprised of Western and Russian experts with diverse intellectual and professional backgrounds and was charged with investigating a specific dimension of Russia’s political, financial, sociodemographic, and security problems. The capstone of the project was an integrated policy-relevant report and video that presented a holistic picture of Russia’s current predicament and strategic trajectory. In addition to generating in-depth follow-on studies, the Russia Initiative provided the anchor for the Corporation’s continued support for high-level dialogues, as well as for U.S.-based research on specific issues related to Russia’s nonproliferation policies, conflict management in the Caucasus and Central Asia and bilateral security issues. To keep focus on Russia and to revitalize systematic understandings of Moscow’s strategic posture, the Corporation also provided grants to the Center for Strategic and International Studies to administer the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS). This consists of a group of young American and Russian scholars on Russia and various aspects of U.S.-Russian relations who use an electronic network and meetings to enhance their research, integrate their work and make their research relevant to the American policy-making community through annual policy conferences in Washington, D.C.

In light of the Corporation’s long-term commitment to higher education in the U.S. and abroad, and given the dire state of higher education and the economic crisis that followed the Soviet collapse, Gregorian and the Corporation’s board of trustees extended the grantmaking focus to spearhead formation of the Higher Education in the Former Soviet Union (HEFSU) initiative aimed at strengthening universities and academic communities in the region. A particular emphasis was placed on the social sciences and the humanities, “fields that have been comparatively neglected by Western donors in the past,” noted Gregorian. At the core of this initiative has been support—in partnership with several American foundations, including the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Russian Ministry of Education and Science—for creation of nine Centers for Advanced Study and Education (CASEs) at Russian regional universities. Each CASE serves as an umbrella for stimulating research in the social sciences and humanities, bridging research with teaching, transforming curricula and pedagogy, upgrading university libraries, forging academic links both across Russia and with American institutions, and nurturing a new generation of scholars. In addition, the first nine CASEs in Russia provided the springboard for four additional centers in the South Caucasus and Belarus, as well as parallel projects aimed at advancing fundamental scientific research in Russia and promoting desperately needed administrative reforms at universities across Russia and the NIS.
Benchmark Achievements

The Corporation’s extensive investment in Soviet/post-Soviet-related projects was successful in many ways at meeting specified programmatic objectives. A seminal set of achievements pertained to the direct-line effects that grant clusters had on U.S. and Russian policymaking. For example, former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry attributes much of his success in office at forging historically unprecedented U.S.-Russian “military-to-military” cooperation to the opportunity provided via Carnegie Corporation support (which he received earlier, as a Stanford University scholar) to devise the conceptual underpinnings of preventive measures. Similarly, the Corporation’s funding provided a decisive catalyst for mobilizing the intellectual critical mass needed to refine basic thinking, flesh out operational details, promote the significance and update assessment of the landmark Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act in 1991 (or the eponymous “Nunn-Lugar” after its bipartisan patrons in the U.S. Senate) and related legislation. As recounted by former Senator Sam Nunn (who is also a former Corporation trustee), Ashton Carter, a Carnegie Corporation grantee, gave a compelling series of breakfast presentations on cooperative security before an august group of Congressmen who were instrumental to his and Senator Lugar’s efforts at securing “one of the fastest turnarounds in both the Senate and House” in support of their sponsored legislation. Senator Nunn also credits the Corporation with providing “unburdened and uncompromising” travel to Russia for frank conversations with Gorbachev about the seriousness of “new thinking” that were critical for easing the politics to establish joint risk reduction centers. Subsequent trips enabled Senator Nunn personally to gain a first-hand appreciation for the chaos experienced within the Russian defense complex. This, he claims, reinvigorated his subsequent campaign to convince skeptics in the Congress and executive branch to unlock initial funding for U.S. nuclear dismantlement and safety assistance to Russia.

The Corporation’s support also occasionally had a direct impact on Russian policymaking. The Hague Initiative, for instance, brought together senior Russian and Chechen political advisors for rare informal discussions on settling the ongoing war in Chechnya in 1996. The meeting produced a “ten-point” statement on resolving the conflict that was embedded in the main provisions of the first, though illfated, peace plan signed by both leaderships only several months later.
The Corporation’s Russia-related grants also indirectly influenced policymaking in both countries. Sponsored dialogues and linkages between Russian and American policymakers, officers, insiders and experts were instrumental at dismantling stereotypes that, according to Senator Nunn, “serve as the template for future efforts to clear the air with America’s European allies.” The Aspen Institute’s Congressional Program, led by former Senator Richard Clark, was especially effective at building a bipartisan cadre of nearly 120 Congressional leaders, first on arms control and then on a broader set of issues concerning Russia. This group transcended the dramatic legislative turnover and played integral roles in shaping U.S. policy debates on NATO expansion and aide packages to the former Soviet Union. Several U.S. Senators specifically acknowledged this experience as vital to their education on Russia, as well as to making personal contact with respected experts who they felt comfortable calling on for advice. The winning formula of this ongoing dialogue on Russia, notes Clark, is that it “serves as a unique forum for U.S. legislators to engage experts and distill their own policy implications, while allowing them and their spouses to fraternize free from the distractions of Washington and their home districts.”

On the Russian front, support to Duke University produced guidelines for election coverage that were used by the Russian government as a guide for the election laws in 1993. The Carnegie Moscow Center also played a crucial role, sustaining independent policy analysis amid shifting political winds in Russia. As observed by Arsenian, the Center provides a “safe home” for meaningful exchanges between Russian policy analysts, journalists and officials that has become a model not only for other NGOs but for budding Russian philanthropists interested in creating additional sources of independent analysis within the country.

In addition to the impact on policymaking, the Corporation’s support was integral to catalyzing knowledge-based communities composed of scholars and researchers from the hard and social sciences. This produced collaborative understandings of concepts such as “cooperative security” and “preventive defense,” as well as via the Russia Initiative, deeper appreciation for the interlocking travails of post-Soviet transformation. Furthermore, the Corporation’s support for joint study groups provided effective mechanisms for translating these collaborative problem-solving approaches into the policy realm. Hamburg recalls that Gorbachev was especially keen on using the findings generated by these groups to stretch his thinking about the long-term implications of Soviet reforms and the prospects for creating a “soft landing” for Russia’s future relations with its new neighbors and the U.S. The same expert findings also carried weight among American policymakers. On more than one occasion, President Ronald Reagan’s senior advisors on the Soviet Union turned to these groups for the substantive basis of their policy recommendations for responding to Gorbachev’s reforms. According to several sources, President Reagan personally enjoyed such presentations and valued independent scholar-scientist contact, sometimes incorporating group findings into his speeches, as well as using their audience to send conciliatory signals to the Soviet Union.
Carnegie Corporation’s support also filled important voids in both the American and Russian academic terrain. The graduate programs in the U.S. reinvigorated interdisciplinary expertise in the region, as well as exposed students to first-rate training in sophisticated social science methods that provided a sound basis for scholarly research and policy analysis. Ironically, this training became especially important with the collapse of the Soviet Union, as it created a new generation of specialists in the area who had both the rigorous training and strong appreciation for the historical legacy to contend with the contradictory dynamic and static dimensions to post-Soviet transformation.

Furthermore, as the Academy subsequently deemphasized area studies, the Corporation’s research grants provided modest relief by including provisions to support valuable research assistantships, travel and work-study for graduate students. This was complemented by PONARS, which offered important practical grounding for young scholars to test new ideas for research with each other, and to tease out the implications for policy with American government officials.

The Corporation’s HEFSU initiative, even in mid-course, has had a demonstrable and growing impact on Russian scholars in the much overlooked social sciences and humanities that are key to Russia’s intellectual integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. In addition to renewing infrastructure and affording regional access to valuable scholarly and professional periodicals, IPS grants have supported 6,000-7,000 academics and introduced entirely novel approaches to learning across Russia. Grants to Stanford University created a virtual classroom environment (via distance learning technologies and pedagogies) where Russian and American students and faculty now exchange perspectives and methodologies for understanding contemporary international terrorism and other security issues. This has been reinforced by grants to Russian faculty for travel to U.S. institutions to forge collaborative research and teaching ventures with American colleagues, refine social science curricula and develop new courses.

The Corporation’s investment in Russia-related projects also produced notable unintended consequences. The Russia Initiative, in particular, spawned ongoing dialogues not only between economic and security specialists, but also across generations in Russia on the country’s future trajectory. The joint study groups, as observed by Steinbruner, are the only venue where “the old guard steeped in traditional hard security can interact and exchange views on the country’s predicament in a
politically safe setting with Russia's new, forward-thinking young class of entrepreneurs." Another byproduct has been the afterglow of the Hague Initiative that exceeded the otherwise modest impact on tempering hostilities in the North Caucasus. Speedie has observed, for instance, that some of the early ideas on center-regional relations and political autonomy for coping with the problems posed by Tatarstan and Chechnya have been aired by similar participants in more recent discussions about crisis prevention in the broader Islamic world. Finally, Carnegie Corporation’s experience fostered synergies with the MacArthur Foundation’s regional education and training programs, as well as produced spillover effects for other American foundations working in Russia. As acknowledged by Senator Nunn, the current chair of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), the Corporation’s model for “bringing bright people together to analyze problems in depth and creating a pipeline for transferring new ideas into the policymaking community for valuable practical effect” is one that he hopes to replicate with NTI’s grantmaking efforts.
Growing Pains

Despite the impressive record, Carnegie Corporation’s achievements did not come easy. There were persistent concerns, both internally and externally, that the fixation on preventing “high consequence” events, such as stemming nuclear leakage and ethnic wars, crowded out “high probability” issues on the agenda concerning the strategic impact of conventional arms proliferation, potential dampening effects of civil and ethnic tensions on regional interstate conflicts and the modalities of regional and ethnic autonomy within post-Soviet federal structures. Early projects aimed at strengthening democratic institutions came under particular scrutiny for overemphasizing elite and macro-level projects while neglecting developments on the ground in different Russian and NIS localities and civil society. Emphasis on promoting a “grand democratic bargain” also tended to circumscribe support for exploring likely alternative futures for Russia, including the prospects and strategic implications for carving out stable but incremental (and even dysfunctional) paths to political and economic transition. That said, given the stakes and intense uncertainty at the time, the initial preoccupation with averting nuclear war and expediting democratization was warranted, if not imperative. Moreover, it is clear that the Corporation board and program staff were initially cautious about investing too heavily in a “big bang” approach to democratic change, and as revealed in the ensuing PDC and IPS programs were open to modifying the Corporation’s grantmaking strategy to keep pace with the changing landscape.

Another set of challenges and hard lessons pertained to the distribution and sustainability of the Corporation’s grants. A common criticism leveled against the programs was that they were too “top-heavy” in engaging elites, political insiders, and leading academic institutions. Projects tended to solicit interest among senior U.S. officials who were removed from events on the ground, at the expense of enlisting mid-level bureaucrats who directly “worked” the main issues of U.S.-Russian relations. Grant clusters also were concentrated overwhelmingly in “top-flight” American universities and research centers that were prone to limit project collaboration and were slow to transition from training to partnership relations with former Soviet institutions. This also effectively limited the geographic scope of Russia-related training, research and exposure within the U.S. Similarly, grants were heavily skewed toward contending with the challenges faced by Russia and its capital cities. Although over time there was growing support for projects concerning the South Caucasus and Central Asia, there was far less attention to Ukraine and Moldova, where the possibilities of domestic conflict and failed democratic transitions loomed large. Within Russia, the Moscowcentrism arguably detracted from further cultivating and engaging local leaders and experts with independent stakes in upholding, monitoring and sustaining project objectives throughout the country. At times, it seemed that the Corporation’s sponsored activities in both countries were too close to sympathetic political administrations and liberal establishments, and too far removed from more skeptical leaderships and constituencies. Notwithstanding these idiosyncrasies, the Corporation was not insensitive to casting a wider net in the region, as evidenced by HEFSU’s subsequent effort to support universities and academic communities in Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the South Caucasus. Ultimately, the programs operated within the constraints of the Corporation’s charter (that proscribed direct grants to former Soviet institutions) to
prompt diverse American and Eurasian partners to think critically and persistently about fundamental peace and security issues that transcended the fluid political terrain.
Conclusion
In retrospect, the Corporation’s commitment over the past two decades to supporting independent work related to Russia and Eurasia was unstinting. Though clearly not the only foundation working in the area, Carnegie Corporation stood out for the longevity of its focused support for U.S.-Russian projects. Guided by the visions of two Corporation presidents and strategic iterations of four major grantmaking programs, the Corporation adroitly navigated constantly shifting terrain to unite policymakers, academics, scientists and publics in the U.S., Russia, and the NIS in pursuit of mutual interests and understanding. This experience evolved from a necessary focus on penetrating the dangerous Cold War mentality and coping with concerns for averting nuclear war in both the U.S. and Soviet Union, to solidifying true partnership on a broad range of contemporary hard and soft global security issues. Whereas the Corporation’s success at the former placed a premium on engaging elites and nurturing bright lights in respective scholarly and policy communities, it has since made valuable contributions towards integrating the region into the Euro-Atlantic community by spreading the seeds of new opportunities for knowledge and interaction across Russian and NIS societies. Although the business of transformation in Eurasia remains unfinished, it is clear that Carnegie Corporation exhibited remarkable dexterity at staying the course in good times and bad times of the bilateral relationship, leveraging relatively modest investments for enduring impact on the region and U.S.-Russia relations.

Now that you’ve read this article, please take a few minutes to tell us what you thought about it.

Did it increase your understanding of the subject?
☐ Yes ☐ No

Was it well written?
☐ Yes ☐ No

Name: ____________________________

Affiliation: _______________________

E-Mail: ___________________________ Other comments: